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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On appeal, the primary question before this Court is whether a motel housekeeper acts as
a state actor when she calls the police to report drugs in a motel room, takes the responding
officer to the room, and unlocks and opens the door to the room for the officer to see a syringe
on the floor. The district court determined the housekeeper acted as the State's agent because the
officer knew of and acquiesced in the search and the housekeeper intended to assist law
enforcement. The State argues otherwise on appeal. This Court, however, should affirm the
district court's order suppressing the evidence from the officer's unlawful search through the
housekeeper. Substantial and competent evidence supports the district court's findings on the
officer's knowledge and acquiescence and the housekeeper's intentions. Moreover, the district
court's application of those findings to the relevant factors is not only legally sound, but also
consistent with case law in Idaho and other jurisdictions. Therefore, Mr. Cox respectfully
requests this Court affirm this part of the district court's order on his suppression motion.
On cross-appeal, Mr. Cox challenges another part of the district court's order that denied
his motion to suppress evidence later found on his person. Mr. Cox argues the district court erred
by denying this part of his motion because the evidence found on his person was tainted by the
initial illegality of the officer and the housekeeper's actions. Therefore, he respectfully requests
this Court vacate this part of the district court's order on his motion and remand for further
proceedings.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the morning of October 14, 2019, a housekeeper at a Super 8 Motel told the lead
housekeeper, Ms. Briggs, that she saw a syringe on the floor in Room 221 and left the room.
(R.,p.140.) Ms. Briggs went to Room 221 to confirm. (R., p.140.) Under the motel's policy,
Ms. Briggs had the authority to enter rooms to clean and assess safety concerns. (R., p.140.)
Once Ms. Briggs unlocked and opened the door to the room, she could see the syringe in the
floor from outside the doorway. (R., p.140.) She went into the room and saw a colored liquid in
the syringe. (R., p.140.) Ms. Briggs was concerned that the liquid was heroin based on her
experiences with drug use in her family. (R., pp.140--41.) She also saw a towel with blood on it,
but that was not unusual or concerning on its own. (R., p.141.) After seeing these items,
Ms. Briggs left the room. (R., p.141.)
Ms. Briggs called the Moscow Police Department to report the syringe, and Sergeant
Dahlinger arrived at the motel about twenty to thirty minutes later. (R., p.141; Tr.,1 p.123, Ls.1621, p.139, Ls.18-22.) He asked her what room the syringe was in, and she told him Room 221.
(R., p.141; Tr., p.124, Ls.15-19.) Ms. Briggs took him to the room and unlocked and opened the

door for him. (R., p.141.) She pointed out the syringe to him. (Tr., p.127, Ls.20-23.) From the
open doorway, Sergeant Dahlinger could see the syringe on the floor and the colored liquid
inside. (R., p.141.) He recognized the liquid as "probably heroin from his 'training and
experience."' (R., p.141.) Sergeant Dahlinger entered the room and seized the syringe.
(R., p.141.) He asked another officer to come to the motel and secure the room so he could apply
for a search warrant. (R., p.141.) Officer Payne responded. (R, p.141.)

1

There are two transcripts on appeal contained in one electronic document. Citations to the
transcript will refer to the page number in the bottom center of each page, rather than each
transcript's internal pagination in the bottom right comer.
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At some point during Sergeant Dahlinger's investigation, Ms. Briggs told him that
Lonnie Cox had rented Room 221. (R., p.141.) Sergeant Dahlinger told Officer Payne, and
Officer Payne searched for active warrants for Mr. Cox. (R., p.141.) The officers learned
Mr. Cox had an active warrant for his arrest out of a different county. (R., p.142.)
Sergeant Dahling er' s test of the liquid in the syringe showed a presumptive positive for
heroin. (R., p.142.) He included this information in his search warrant affidavit, along with his
discovery of the syringe in Room 221. (R., p.142.) About two hours after his arrival at the motel,
he obtained a search warrant for Mr. Cox's room, his person, and his car. (R., p.142.) Sergeant
Dahlinger and Officer Payne searched the room. (R., p.143.) They found methamphetamine and
drug paraphernalia. (R., p .14 3.)
The next morning, October 15, officers learned from motel staff that Mr. Cox was back in
his room. (R., p.143.) Sergeant Dahlinger, Officer Payne, and other officers went to the motel.
(R., p.143.) Officer Payne confirmed Mr. Cox's outstanding arrest warrant. (R., p.143.) The
officers knocked on Room 221 and ordered Mr. Cox to exit. (R., p.143.) He complied.
(R., p.143.) The officers arrested Mr. Cox and searched him. (R., p.143.) They found heroin on
his person. (R., p.143.) The officers searched the room again and found heroin in a backpack.
(R., p.143.)
Due to this contraband, the State alleged Mr. Cox committed two counts of possession of
a controlled substance (heroin and methamphetamine) and one count of possession of
paraphernalia. (R., pp.26-27.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate judge found probable
cause for the offenses and bound Mr. Cox over to district court. (R., pp.41--44, 46.) The State
charged Mr. Cox by Information with those three offenses. (R., pp.61-62.) Mr. Cox pied not
guilty. (R., pp.67-68.)
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Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cox moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the searches of
his motel room and his person. (R., pp.69-71.) He argued, inter alia: (1) Sergeant Dahlinger's
observations and first search of Mr. Cox's room to seize the syringe were unlawful because
Mr. Cox did not consent to Sergeant Dahlinger's entry; (2) the search warrant was invalid
because Sergeant Dahlinger used tainted evidence from the first search to establish probable
cause for the warrant; and (3) the officers' third search of Mr. Cox's room was unlawful because
they could not re-execute the search warrant. (R., pp.72-86.) The State responded in opposition.
(R., pp.90-112.) The State argued, inter alia: (1) Sergeant Dahlinger's observation of the syringe
through door opened by Ms. Briggs was not a search; (2) the search warrant was valid even if the
Sergeant Dahlinger' s seizure of the syringe (and subsequent testing of the substance inside) was
removed from his warrant application; and (3) the officers' search of Mr. Cox's person was valid
incident to the arrest warrant's execution. (R., pp.90-112.) Although the State believed the
re-execution of the warrant was lawful, the State noted it did not intend to introduce any
contraband seized from Mr. Cox's room during that third search. (R., p.99 (page 10, footnote 6
of State's response).)
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Cox's motion. (R., pp.129-31.) At the start of the
hearing, the district court confirmed the State did not intend to introduce any contraband seized
from the third search of Mr. Cox's room. (Tr., p.88, L.22-p.89, L.22; see also R., p.140 n.1
(district court's decision).) The State also clarified its position that Sergeant Dahlinger's
observation of the syringe from the opened door was "proper," but it was "not arguing that it was
okay for him to go in and seize that needle or to do the NIK test from it, absent the warrant."
(Tr., p.91, L.20-p.92, L.1.) Ms. Briggs, Sergeant Dahlinger, and Officer Payne testified. (See
generally Tr., p.99-202.) The district court also admitted ten exhibits, which included Sergeant
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Dahlinger's affidavit for the search warrant, the search warrant, the warrant return and order, the
outstanding arrest warrant, and five photographs of Mr. Cox's room from the various searches.
(Exs., pp.12-37.)
Relevant here, Ms. Briggs provided testimony on her intentions in dealing with the
syringe. She initially testified that having the syringe in the room was a safety issue. (Tr., p.109,
Ls.23-p.110, L.1.) She explained, "And then per protocol, basically, if you find an unsafe
situation you call the proper authorities, be it the police or fire or whatever, it doesn't matter. It's
just, it was an unsafe situation, so that's what I did." (Tr., p.110, Ls.5-9.) She agreed that she
thought the syringe was something illegal. (Tr., p.110, Ls.10-12.) She testified that she opened
the door for Sergeant Dahlinger "[b]ecause of the unsafe situation," (Tr., p.116, Ls.8-9).
However, later in her testimony, she testified that she had resolved the safety issue before
Sergeant Dahling er' s arrival:
Q. So, um, you responded to [the prosecutor] that you have the authority to go
into a room to assess danger?
A. When -- when -- when an employee brings a situation up to me where it's a
dangerous thing, then, yes, then I have to go and see why. Well, what do you
mean, it's dangerous? Do you mean that there's bags in your way so that you
can't crawl over them to get to the bed without falling over. You know, there's -that classifies that way.

Q. Sure. And that's why you went there?
A. Of course.
Q. The first time?
A. Yes. Because she had brought that to my attention, so I consider that a safety
issue. So I had to go up and make sure that that's what she saw and -- yes.

Q. But when you, um, went up there with the police officer, you weren 't going to
assess the danger.

A. I had already done it.
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Q. Correct. So you were going to show the officer.
A. Of course.

(Tr., p.132, L.16-p.133, L.13 (emphasis added).) Sergeant Dahlinger testified that he did not ask,
suggest, command, or order Ms. Briggs to open the door. (Tr., p.140, Ls.18-23.) He believed
Ms. Briggs opened the door of her own volition. (Tr., p.141, Ls.1-2.) He also testified, however,
that he went to the room because Ms. Briggs asked him if he wanted to see the room "or
something to that effect." (Tr., p.165, Ls.22-24.) In addition, Sergeant Dahlinger said that he
seized the syringe because it was ''unsafe" and he needed to secure the room for a search
warrant. (Tr., p.145, Ls.3-7.) Sergeant Dahlinger also discussed the subsequent search of
Mr. Cox's person in October 15. He testified that he advised Mr. Cox of both the search warrant
and the arrest warrant before the officers began searching him. (Tr., p.157, Ls.12-18.) Lastly,
Officer Payne testified that he regularly checks any suspect' s name in the database for warrants.
(Tr., p.197, L.20-p.180, L.1.) He agreed that, on October 15, Sergeant Dahlinger advised
Mr. Cox of both warrants. (Tr., p.189, Ls.5-8.) Officer Payne testified that he "was acting mostly
off the arrest warrant" when he detained Mr. Cox. (Tr., p.190, L.18-p.191, L.6.) Officer Payne
also said he served the arrest warrant on Mr. Cox. (Tr., p.191, Ls.21-23.)
After further argument by the parties, including whether Ms. Briggs was a state actor, the
district court took the matter under advisement. (See Tr., pp.202-240 (argument and discussion
by the parties and the district court).)
About a month later, the district court entered an order granting in part and denying in
part Mr. Cox's motion to suppress. (R., pp.139-58.) The district court suppressed any evidence
found in Mr. Cox's hotel room, including the syringe, but did not suppress the heroin found on
him. (R., pp.139-40, 158.) In reaching its decision, the district court made detailed factual
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findings based on Ms. Briggs's and the officers' testimony. (See R., pp.139--43.) Significantly,
the district court found:
Briggs testified that she was not going to the room to clean, nor was she going
there to assess danger. Instead, Briggs' sole purpose in going to the room with
Dahlinger was to show him the syringe, which she did upon opening the door. It
is undisputed that Dahlinger did not expressly ask or direct Briggs to open the
door.
(R., p.141.) The district court also recited Officer Payne's testimony "that it is his normal
practice to always run a suspect's name" and that he searched Mr. Cox incident to the arrest, not
in execution of the search warrant. (R., pp.142, 143.)
After extensive factual findings, the district court first ruled Sergeant Dahlinger' s
observation of the syringe from the opened door was an unlawful search. (R., pp.144-53.) The
district court made three key determinations to reach its decision. First, the district court
recognized Mr. Cox, as a motel guest, had a privacy interest in his room. (R., pp.145--47.)
Second, the district court ruled Ms. Briggs was a state actor when she unlocked and opened the
door for Sergeant Dahlinger to see inside Mr. Cox's room. (R., pp.147-53.) The district court
properly identified "two critical factors" from case law to determine if Ms. Briggs was Sergeant
Dahlinger's agent. (R., pp.150-51.) Those factors are (1) whether Sergeant Dahlinger knew of
and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct and (2) whether Ms. Briggs intended to assist law
enforcement or further her own ends. (R., pp.150-51.) Relying on its factual findings from
Ms. Briggs's and Sergeant Dahlinger' s testimony, the district court held both factors established
Ms. Briggs was a state actor. (R., pp.151-5 3.) Third, the district court determined Ms. Briggs's
opening of the door for Sergeant Dahlinger was a "search": "The door to Cox's room had to be
unlocked and opened in order for the syringe to be visible to the public. Dahlinger did not have a
view of the syringe from the hallway until Briggs opened the door .... " (R., p.153.) Therefore,
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the district court concluded, "Dahlinger's view into Cox's room after Briggs, acting as a
governmental agent, opened the locked door amounts to a warrantless search. No exception to
the warrant requirement applies, thus rendering the search unreasonable under the federal and
Idaho constitutions." (R., p.15 3.) The district court suppressed evidence pertaining to the syringe.
(R., p.158.)
Second, the district court ruled the search warrant for Mr. Cox's room, his car, and his
person lacked probable cause if Sergeant Dahlinger's observations of the syringe and his
subsequent seizure and testing of the syringe were excluded from his application. (R., pp.15356.) The district court identified that the only information left in his affidavit would be
Ms. Briggs's report of a "syringe," that Sergeant Dahling er was dispatched "to a report of
'drugs,"' and his opinion that motel rooms are commonly used for illegal activities, such as drug
dealing and use. (R., pp.154-55.) The district court discussed that the affidavit lacked any
information on Mr. Briggs's observation of the liquid in the syringe. (R., p.156.) "Instead," the
district court stated, "the magistrate was simply left with information that a syringe was found in
a motel room." (R., p.156.) "Given all the information properly before the magistrate," the
district court determined "there was insufficient evidence" to establish probable cause for the
search. (R., p.156.) As such, the district court suppressed the evidence found during any of the
searches of Mr. Cox's hotel room. (R., p.156.)
Third, the district court did not suppress the heroin found on Mr. Cox. (R., pp.157-58.)
The district court reasoned:
Given the information Dahlinger obtained from Briggs regarding her observations
of the syringe, the fact Dahlinger obtained Cox's name from Briggs in connection
with the room, and the fact Officer Payne, as a pattern and practice, always "runs"
the names of suspects to check for warrants, Cox's arrest and subsequent search
incident to arrest on the arrest warrant were not tied to the unlawful search or the
improper search warrant. Stated differently, even without the unlawful search,
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Dahlinger and Officer Payne would have still had the information from Briggs
that would have allowed them to "run" Cox's name and find he had a valid arrest
warrant, and even without the search warrant Cox's person was subject to search
based on the arrest warrant.
(R., pp.157-58.) The district court concluded, "The search incident to arrest was independent of
the unlawful search and improper search warrant. Therefore, the heroin found on Cox's person
will not be suppressed." (R., p.158.)
The State timely appealed from the district court's order. (R., pp.161-63.) Mr. Cox
timely cross-appealed. (R., pp.189-90.)

9

ISSUE ON APPEAL
The State frames the issue as:
Did the district court erroneously conclude that the hotel employee's act of opening Cox's hotel
room door constituted a governmental search implicating the Fourth Amendment?
Mr. Cox reframes the issue as:
Did the district court properly grant Mr. Cox's motion to suppress in part when it determined the
police officer unlawfully searched Mr. Cox's motel room once the housekeeper unlocked and
opened Mr. Cox's door for the officer?
ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL
Did the district court erroneously deny Mr. Cox's motion to suppress in part when it determined
the search of Mr. Cox incident to his arrest on the outstanding warrant was independent from the
police officer's unlawful search of Mr. Cox's motel room?

ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
The District Court Properly Granted Mr. Cox's Motion To Suppress In Part When It Determined
The Police Officer Unlawfully Searched Mr. Cox's Motel Room Once The Housekeeper
Unlocked And Opened Mr. Cox's Door For The Officer
A.

Introduction
Mr. Cox argues the district court properly granted his motion to suppress in part because

Sergeant Dahlinger unlawfully searched Mr. Cox's locked motel room when Sergeant Dahlinger,
through Ms. Briggs as his agent, gained access to see inside Mr. Cox's room. The district court
correctly discussed the two-factor test to identify a state actor, correctly applied its thorough
factual findings to those factors, and correctly ruled Ms. Briggs acted for the state in unlocking
and opening Mr. Cox's door for Sergeant Dahlinger. Due to this unlawful search, the district
court rightly suppressed the evidence found in Mr. Cox's motel room from the officers' multiple
searches. Mr. Cox respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order partially
granting his suppression motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014); State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App.
2013). The Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact "unless they are clearly erroneous."

Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also Ellis,
155 Idaho at 587. "At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court."

Ellis, 155 Idaho at 587. The Court exercises free review over the "application of constitutional
principles in light of those facts." Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418.
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C.

The District Court Correctly Determined The Housekeeper Acted As The Officer's Agent
When The Housekeeper Opened Mr. Cox's Motel Room With The Officer's Knowledge
And Acquiescence And For The Sole Purpose Of Assisting The Officer's Investigation
The Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend.

IV. This protection, however, only "applies to governmental action." Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465, 475 (1921); accord United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); State v.
Pontier, 103 Idaho 91, 94 (1982); State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 517 (Ct. App. 1994). Thus,

evidence obtained through a private search, no matter the illegality, is not subject to suppression
under the Fourth Amendment. Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517; see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115
("Whether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or
unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character.")
Nevertheless, the State cannot simply designate a search as "private" to avoid the Fourth
Amendment. If the private party acts as the State's "instrument or agent" in effecting the search,
the Fourth Amendment protections apply. Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517; see also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971). The defendant has the burden to establish the State's

involvement in the private party's search. State v. Breese, 160 Idaho 841, 843 (Ct. App. 2016).
Idaho courts have recognized "a 'gray area' between the extremes of overt governmental
participation in a search and the complete absence of such participation." Breese, 160 Idaho at
843 (quoting Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517). "These 'gray area' inquiries can best be resolved on a
case-by-case basis, consistently applying certain principles." Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517. Trivial or
incidental po lice contact with a private party before or during a search does not make the private
party as a state actor. Breese, 160 Idaho at 843--44. Rather, the State must "directly as a
participant or indirectly as an encourager" "be involved" in the private party's actions. Id. at 844.
As such, Idaho courts consider "two critical factors" to identify a state actor: ( 1) ''whether the
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government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct" and (2) "whether the party
performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or further his or her own ends."
Id. at 844.

Before examining those factors here, it is important to recognize the related issues that
the State does not challenge on appeal. The State does not contest Mr. Cox's expectation of
privacy in his motel room. (See generally App. Br.; see also R., p.145-56 (district court's
discussion of Mr. Cox's privacy interest).) Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) ("No
less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house, a guest in a hotel
room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." (citation
omitted)); People v. McGrew, 462 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1969) (en bane), abrogated on other grounds
by People v. McKinnon, 500 P.2d 1097 (Cal. 1972) (en bane) ("The hotel guest may reasonably

expect a maid to enter his room to clean up, but absent unusual circumstances he should not be
held to expect that a hotel clerk will lead the police on a search ofhis room."). The State does not
dispute that Sergeant Dahlinger's observations of Mr. Cox's room once Ms. Briggs opened the
door was a search. (See generally App. Br.; R., p.152.) The State also does not dispute the
district court's ruling that Sergeant Dahlinger's application did not establish probable cause
without his observations from Mr. Cox's room. (App. Br., p.10 n.3.) Further, the State does not
argue, consistent with its concession below, that Sergeant Dahlinger could have entered
Mr. Cox's room to seize the syringe without the warrant. (App. Br., pp.10-11.) Finally, the State
does not raise any other exception to the warrant requirement. (See generally App. Br.) Thus, the
crux of this case is whether Ms. Briggs was a state actor. The district court correctly determined
that she was.
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1.

Sergeant Dahlinger knew of and acquiesced in Ms. Briggs's search

The district court properly determined the first factor established Ms. Briggs as an agent
of Sergeant Dahlinger. There is no dispute that Sergeant Dahlinger knew Ms. Briggs was going
to show him the syringe in Room 221. (R., p.141; see also R., p.151 ("It is undisputed that the
only reason Briggs went to the room the second time was to show Dahlinger the syringe. . . , and
it was readily apparent to Dahlinger that Briggs was not going to the room for any other
purpose.").) There is also no dispute that Sergeant Dahlinger accepted Ms. Briggs's actions.
(R., pp.151-52.) He did not protest when she took him to the room or ask her to stop opening the

door. (See R., pp.152-53.) To this end, the district court found:
.... Dahlinger could have declined to follow Briggs to Cox's room and instead
waited for Cox to return to engage him directly about what Briggs saw, or waited
for Cox to enter his room and then knocked on the door hoping Cox would open it
and expose the contents inside to Dahlinger's view. Instead Briggs invited
Dahlinger to view the syringe in Cox's room where Cox had a legitimate and
significate privacy interest. While Dahlinger did not expressly request Briggs to
open the door, he acquiesced in the intrusive conduct knowing Briggs intended to
assist law enforcement efforts by showing him the syringe. To allow such conduct
by law enforcement would eviscerate the warrant requirement.
(R., p.153.) Thus, the district court's factual findings establish Sergeant Dahlinger had full
knowledge of and wholly assented to Ms. Briggs's intrusive conduct in showing him the syringe.
The State claims Sergeant Dahlinger was no more than a "passive witness" because he
did not ask, suggest, command, or order Ms. Briggs to open the door. (App. Br., p.7.) This first
factor, however, is not contingent upon whether the officer directed the private party to do
something. "Government involvement or participation in a search with a private person is not
always in the form of an officer's imperative direction to the private individual: 'Make the
search' There are more subtle and less obvious forms of governmental involvement, but
governmental involvement nonetheless." State v. Abdouch, 434 N.W.2d 317, 324 (Neb. 1989).
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For example, in Abdouch, officers accompanied a family to search a deceased family member's
house to take possession of the deceased's belongings. Id. at 320. Once they arrived at the house,
the officers and family began searching for various items. Id. The officers also went to an
adjacent barn, looked inside, and found marijuana. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized
that the family would not have gone into the house without the officers and thus "[ e]ntry into
was into the house was gained under auspices of the officers." Id. at 325. Although the officers
never directed the family to search, "the officers placed the ... family in a position to search the
... residence-an official involvement which cannot be reasonably characterized as passive." Id.
The court concluded, "Without conceptual dissection of the search into degrees of responsibility
and participation, suffice it to say that the search would not have occurred without the officers'
presence and involvement, which, under the circumstances, constituted a search as a joint
endeavor of private persons and the State's officers." Id. at 326. Similar to Abdouch, Sergeant
Dahlinger did not direct Ms. Briggs to open the door, but Ms. Briggs would not have opened the
door without his presence. Sergeant Dahlinger understood that Ms. Briggs's conduct was for his
benefit and assented to her conduct.
In arguing Sergeant Dahling er was a mere witness, the State also pointed to Ms. Briggs's
intentions in showing Sergeant Dahlinger the syringe. (App. Br., p.7.) Ms. Briggs's intentions are
not relevant to the first factor of the government's knowledge and acquiescence. United States v.
Reed, 15 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1994), is instructive-and especially so because it involves a hotel

manager opening a room with police present. In Reed, the Ninth Circuit held the manager acted
as a state agent when he opened and described the contents of a room with officers at the door
"to protect him." Id. at 930. There, the manager suspected a guest was using his hotel room "for
drug activities." Id. He called the police to send officers to the hotel "to protect him while he
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checked the room." Id. Two officers stood in the doorway while the manager unlocked the room.

Id. One officer briefly stepped in the room "to assure his safety" and saw contraband. Id. The
manager also opened containers in the room and described the contents to the officers. Id. The
officers did not ask the manager to do this. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that both factors to
determine the manager's agency were satisfied. Id. at 931. On the first factor, the circuit court
explained:
[The officers] definitely "knew of and acquiesced" in [the manager's] search.
They were personally present during the search, knew exactly what [the manager]
was doing as he was doing it, and made no attempt to discourage him from
examining [the defendant's] personal belongings beyond what was required to
protect hotel property. [The manager] reported his findings to them as he
searched.

Id. The facts here are strikingly similar. Sergeant Dahlinger "definitely 'knew of and
acquiesced"' Ms. Brigg's search. Id. He was "personally present," "knew exactly" what she was
doing as she was doing it, and "made no attempt to discourage" her from opening the door. Id.
Thus, the State cannot rely on Ms. Brigg's intentions to prove Sergeant Dahlinger' s mere
passivity. And, the State cannot claim Sergeant Dahlinger's lack of instruction to Ms. Briggs
proves a lack of knowledge or acquiescence. Sergeant Dahlinger did not have to help Ms. Briggs
open the door to create a state action. (See App. Br., p.8.)
The State also takes issue with the district court assigning governmental know ledge and
acquiescence to an officer "merely going to the scene of the private search to see the evidence
thus exposed." (App. Br., p.8.) Yet Sergeant Dahlinger did not merely go to the motel to see
evidence exposed. If Sergeant Dahlinger arrived at the motel after Ms. Briggs had removed the
syringe during her first entry into Mr. Cox's room and had it in the lobby for him, then Sergeant
Dahlinger most likely could lawfully observe and seize the syringe. See Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion) (FBI lawfully obtained packages after shipping
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employee opened them and called FBI to pick them up: "In these cases there was nothing
wrongful about the Government's acquisition of the packages or its examination of their contents
to the extent that they had already been examined by third parties."). The syringe would have
been "exposed" from the private search, and Sergeant Dahlinger could reap the benefit. (See
R., pp.152-53 ("Briggs could have seized the syringe and turned it over to Dahlinger upon his
arrival or taken photos of the syringe and given those to Dahlinger without implicating
constitutional concerns.").) But, even here, the State recognizes that Sergeant Dahlinger did not
go to the motel unaware of the "impending private search." (App. Br., p.8.) Once Sergeant
Dahlinger started following Ms. Briggs to Mr. Cox's room, Sergeant Dahlinger knew Ms. Briggs
was going to unlock and open the door for him to see inside. (R., pp.141, 151.) He did not
merely to go the scene and see the syringe in plain view in the motel lobby.
Contrary to the State's position, Mr. Cox contends Sergeant Dahlinger's "mere
foreknowledge of the impending private search combined with traveling to where it would take
place" does, in fact, "confer[ ] the imprimatur of agency on the non-governmental searching
party." (App. Br., p.8.) Commonwealth v. Borecky, 419 A.2d 753 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), is
helpful to examine an officer's knowledge and assent without express direction. In Borecky, the
court held an informant acted as a state agent when he entered a house and seized a marijuana
sample for an officer. Id. at 754. The officer did not initiate or instruct the informant to search
the house. Id. at 756-57. Nonetheless, the court emphasized that the officer "admitted prior
knowledge of the warrantless search, and acquiescence therein . . . . " Id. at 757. The court
explained that the officer had arranged to meet the informant, planned to get any evidence from
the informant, and searched the informant before he went into the house. Id. at 755, 756. In light
of this knowledge, the court concluded, "[A]lthough it might not be inferred that [the officer]
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either explicitly or implicitly instructed the informant to search [the defendant's] residence for
evidence, it cannot be gainsaid that the warrantless search was conducted with the prior
knowledge and concurrence of the [officer]." Id. at 756. The Borecky analysis is persuasive here.
Although Sergeant Dahlinger did not expressly direct Ms. Briggs to open the door, "it cannot be
gainsaid that the warrantless search was conducted with the prior know ledge and concurrence"
of Sergeant Dahlinger. Id. The district court found Sergeant Dahlinger knew of the impending
search and his "acquiescence therein." Id. at 757. (R., pp.141, 151-53.)
Indeed, Sergeant Dahlinger was far more than a passive witness to Ms. Briggs's
independent actions. A passive witness is usually already at the scene or coming to the scene for
another purpose. For example, in United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1996), cited
by the State, a bus station manager called the police about a package because he did know if he
could lawfully open it or not. Id. at 1241. An officer came to the station and told the manager
that he believed the manager could open the package, but the officer could not. Id. The manager
opened the package. Id. The officer stepped away as the manager opened it, and the officer did
not assist or encourage the manager. Id. The Tenth Circuit determined the officer's involvement
was de minimis because officer did not instigate, orchestrate, or encourage the search. Id. As
another example, in State v. Crawford, 110 Idaho 577 (Ct. App. 1986), officers responded to an
assault call at motel to question the victim and otherwise investigate. Id. at 578. One of the
officers asked the motel manager to get clothing for the "scantily clad" victim from the victim's
room. Id. at 578-79, 80. The officer accompanied the manager because the defendant was still
at-large. Id. at 580. The manager later testified about her observations of the room. Id. The Court
of Appeals determined the officer's contact with the manager was de minimis. Id. "Although the
officer accompanied [the manager], there is no evidence that he encouraged or directed her to
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'search' the motel room.... There were apparently no ulterior motives involved in the entry to
get the clothes and no evidence that any kind of 'search' occurred." Id. The officer's knowledge
and assent was for the manager to get clothes for the victim, not to search the room. Similarly, in
Dawson v. State, 106 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Tex. App. 2003), an officer "simply stopped by the

motel for coffee," which he did intermittently, and the motel manager invited the officer to come
with him to check on a room for damage or abandonment after no contact with the guest for
several days. Id. at 390-91, 392. The officer smelled marijuana once the manager opened the
door. Id. In that situation, the officer was no more than a mere witness to the manager's actions.
Id. at 392-93. Here, in contrast, Ms. Briggs did not call the police because she did not know

what to do about the syringe. Sergeant Dahlinger did not accompany Ms. Briggs to the room for
security, to retrieve unrelated items, or check for damage. Sergeant Dahlinger did not happen to
be stopping by for coffee. Rather, Sergeant Dahlinger specifically came to the motel for
Ms. Briggs's report of drugs, and he knew Ms. Briggs was going to take him to Mr. Cox's room
to show him the syringe.
In light of the district court's factual findings on Sergeant Dahlinger's knowledge and
acquiescence and the pertinent case law, the district court properly ruled Mr. Cox met his burden
on the first factor. Sergeant Dahlinger affirmatively instigated the search because he knew of and
acquiesced to Ms. Briggs taking him to the room and opening the door to show him the syringe.
Sergeant Dahlinger could have simply taken Ms. Briggs's statement, made sure the room stayed
locked and secure, used her statement in his warrant application, and then lawfully searched the
room upon the warrant. Instead of these lawful actions, he decided to see for himself. This first
factor shows Mr. Briggs was a state actor.
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2.

Ms. Briggs intended to assist Sergeant Dahlinger

The district court properly determined the second factor established Ms. Briggs as an
agent of Sergeant Dahlinger. The district court found: "Briggs testified that she was not going to
the room to clean, nor was she going there to assess danger. Instead, Briggs' sole purpose in
going to the room with Dahlinger was to show him the syringe, which she did upon opening the
door." (R., p.141.) The district court also found:
While Briggs was initially acting to further her employer's and her own ends (i.e.,
insure motel staff remained safe while performing their duties) when she invited
Dahlinger to view Cox's room, her only purpose was to show him the syringe,
which she believed to be used for illegal drug activity. Briggs' motive in opening
the door for Dahlinger was to assist law enforcement efforts.
(R., p.152.) In examining Ms. Brigg's intentions, the district court expressed skepticism that
Ms. Briggs only had a concern for her housekeeping staff's safety once she confirmed the
synnge:
While Briggs testified that the syringe in the room would pose a danger to her
staff while cleaning the room, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the
syringe, which was hidden behind the locked door only accessible by Cox and
hotel staff, posed any danger to anyone while the room was locked and empty.
Simply put, Briggs could have instructed her staff not to enter the room until law
enforcement was able to engage Cox directly.
(R., p.152.) Thus, the district court assessed Ms. Briggs's credibility and weighed her testimony
as a whole to find Ms. Briggs intended to assist law enforcement. (R., pp.152-53.) In other
words, the district court found Ms. Briggs did not open Room 221 for Sergeant Dahlinger to
further her own ends.
The State repeatedly cites to Ms. Briggs's testimony on her safety concerns, but the State
omits any citation to Ms. Briggs's testimony where she admits that she already assessed the
danger and was going back to Mr. Cox's room to show the syringe to Sergeant Dahlinger. (App.
Br., p.9; see Tr., p.132, L.16-p.133, L.13.) Thus, the State's challenge to the district court's
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factual finding on Ms. Briggs's intent is not well taken. The district court had substantial and
competent evidence-Ms. Briggs's testimony-for its fmding on her intentions. In addition, the
State cannot contest the district court's credibility fmdings on appeal:
The power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. The district court
is the arbiter of conflicting evidence; its determination of the weight, credibility,
inference, and implications thereof will not be supplanted by this Court's
impressions or conclusions from the written record.

State v. Howard, 155 Idaho 666, 673 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted). It was appropriate for
the district court, in assessing Ms. Briggs's intent, to consider what a reasonable person would,
could, and should have done if the person truly had a safety concern. (R., p.152.) The district
court was not placing a value judgment on how the court "would have handled" the situation.
(App. Br., p.9.) The district court was weighing Ms. Briggs's testimony, resolving any perceived
conflict between her initial testimony of safety concern and her subsequent admission to
assisting Sergeant Dahlinger, and drawing inferences from her testimony. Due to this credibility
assessment used in the district court's factual finding, the Court should reject the State's
challenge the district court's finding that Ms. Briggs intended to assist law enforcement.
If there is any doubt on the Court's rejection of the State's factual finding argument,

Breese dispels it. In Breese, a bus employee smelled marijuana coming from a backpack, called
the police, and searched the backpack upon the officer's arrival. 160 Idaho at 842. The defendant
had argued the employee intended to assist law enforcement, but the Court of Appeals rejected
that argument due to the deference given to the district court's fmdings. Id. at 845-86. Although
the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the defendant pointed out "a portion of the employee's
testimony that may indeed, on its own, contradict the district court's fmdings," the Court of
Appeals also acknowledged that other portions of the employee's testimony supported the
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district court's "express findings." Id. at 846. In light of that conflicting testimony, the Court of
Appeals declined to reject the district court's findings and reweigh the evidence. Id. The Court of
Appeals therefore affirmed the district court's determination of the employee's intent. Id. Just
like Breese, this Court should decline to reweigh the district court's findings on Ms. Briggs's
motivations.
Moreover, relevant case law shows a clear primary intention upon the private party to
further their own interests is required to disprove state action. For instance, in Crawford, 110
Idaho 577, the motel manager "testified that she went to get the clothing for [victim], not only
because the officer asked her to, but because [the victim] was scantily clad and needed the
clothes for her trip to the hospital. There is no evidence that [the manager] had any intent to
collect evidence or to search the motel room as a witting or unwitting agent of the government."

Id. at 580. The Court of Appeals therefore held the manager "had a legitimate independent
motivation for her actions." Id.; see also Breese, 160 Idaho at 846 ("[W]e conclude that there
was substantial evidence to support the district court's finding that the employee's primary
motive in conducting the search was in the legitimate pursuit of his employer's interests."
(emphasis added)). Similarly, in Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, the Tenth Circuit relied on the district
court's fmdings that the bus station manager ''would have opened the package even if the police
had not responded to his call." Id. at 1243. The circuit court held the manager "had a legitimate,
independent motivation to search the package, namely, his independently formed belief that
something was dangerous about the package, and his concern for the passengers on the bus on
which the package was to be shipped." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). In contrast, in

Reed, the Ninth Circuit held the hotel manager's opening of containers in the room while the
officers were present "had no legitimate motive" in protecting hotel property. 15 F.3d at 931-32.
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The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court's endorsement of a private party's aim to
prevent criminal activity as an independent motive because, if that motive was accepted,
"searches by private parties would never trigger the Fourth Amendment," and the second factor
"would be meaningless." Id. at 932. Unlike Crawford, Breese, and Smythe, the district court did
not find that Ms. Briggs had a legitimate independent motivation for her actions in opening
Mr. Cox's room for Sergeant Dahlinger. Like Reed, Ms. Briggs's intentions were to assist
Sergeant Dahlinger in his investigation of the reported drugs. (See R., pp.152-53.)
In light of the district court's credibility assessment, factual findings, and inferences on
Ms. Briggs's intent, the district court properly determined Mr. Cox met his burden on the second
factor. Ms. Briggs's sole purpose in unlocked and opening Mr. Cox's room for Sergeant
Dahlinger was to assist law enforcement efforts. The second factor shows Mr. Briggs was a state
actor.

3.

Through Ms. Briggs as a state actor, Sergeant Dahlinger unlawfully searched
Mr. Cox's room, and that unlawful search requires suppression of any evidence
fromMr. Cox's room

The district court properly held Sergeant Dahlinger, though Ms. Briggs as a state actor,
unlawfully searched Mr. Cox's room when Sergeant Dahlinger saw the syringe on the floor.
(R., pp.151-53.) Sergeant Dahlinger would not have seen the syringe but for the unlocked,
opened door by Ms. Briggs. (R., p.152.) If Sergeant Dahlinger's observations of the syringe are
excised from his warrant application, the warrant lacks probable cause. (R., pp.153-56.) The
State does not challenge this determination by the district court. (App. Br., p.10 n.3.) Therefore,
the district court properly suppressed any evidence obtained from the searches of Mr. Cox's
room, and this Court should affirm the district court's partial grant of Mr. Cox's motion to
suppress.
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ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL
The District Court Erroneously Denied Mr. Cox's Motion To Suppress In Part When It
Determined The Search Of Mr. Cox Incident To His Arrest On The Outstanding Warrant Was
Independent From The Police Officer's Unlawful Search Of Mr. Cox's Motel Room

A.

Introduction
On cross-appeal, Mr. Cox argues the district court erred by denying his motion to

suppress the heroin found on his person. Mr. Cox submits the district court improperly
determined Sergeant Dahlinger and Officer Payne would have discovered his outstanding arrest
warrant independent of Sergeant Dahlinger' s first unlawful search of his motel room.

B.

Standard Of Review
Mr. Cox respectfully refers the Court to the standard of review set out in Part B of his

argument on appeal.

C.

The District Court Should Have Suppressed The Heroin Found On Mr. Cox Because The
Officer's Unlawful Search Of Mr. Cox's Motel Room Tainted The Officers' Subsequent
Discovery Of Evidence On Him
"The exclusionary rule bars the admission or use of evidence gathered in violation of the

Constitution." Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 496 (2001). To avoid application of the
exclusionary rule, the State has the burden to show that the officers obtained the evidence
through an exception to the exclusionary rule. State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, 341 (2019). The
three main exceptions are independent source, inevitable discovery, and attenuation. Stuart, 136
Idaho at 496.
"The independent source doctrine is where a lawful approach actually taken leads to the
discovery of evidence that was also derived from unlawful means." State v. Downing, 163 Idaho
26, 31 (2017). Described another way, "In the classic independent source situation, information
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which is received through an illegal source is considered to be cleanly obtained when it arrives
through an independent source." Stuart, 136 Idaho at 496 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533, 538-39 (1988)).
The inevitable discovery doctrine is "closely related" to the independent source doctrine.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). "[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine asks courts to

engage in a hypothetical finding into the lawful actions law enforcement would have inevitably
taken in the absence of the unlawful avenue that led to the evidence." Downing, 163 Idaho at 31.
Finally, the attenuation doctrine "allows evidence to be admitted 'when the connection
between unconstitutional po lice conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by
some intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that
has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained." State v.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Utah v. Striejf,

136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016)). "The attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the
government's unlawful act and the discovery of evidence, which often has nothing to do with a
defendant's actions." Striejf, 136 S. Ct. at 2061. The Court must consider three factors: "(I) the
elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of
intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement
action." Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 722 (quoting State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004)).
Here, the district court appears to have applied the inevitable discovery doctrine to allow
admission of the evidence found on Mr. Cox's person. Although the district court used the word
"independent" in its analysis, the district court's reasoning indicates its focus on the fact that
Sergeant Dahlinger and Officer Payne "would have still had the information" from Ms. Briggs
on Mr. Cox's identity, "even without the unlawful search." (R., pp.157-58.) This is inevitable
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discovery: the district court considered Sergeant Dahlinger's and Officer's Payne's hypothetical
lawful actions-that they would have received Mr. Cox's name and ran his name anyway-in
the absence of Sergeant Dahlinger's unlawful search. Downing, 163 Idaho at 31. The inevitable
discovery doctrine, however, does not apply to a single course of action. Id. at 32. "The doctrine
must presuppose inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions, not in series
flowing directly from the officers' unlawful conduct." Id. As the Court explained recently in
State v. Maxim:

The inevitable-discovery doctrine presupposes parallel paths leading toward the
inevitable discovery of evidence. If, because of illegal police action, one path
arrives at the evidence before the other does, then the State will be permitted to
prove that the existing alternative path would have yielded the evidence even if
the existing alternative path was cut short due to the discovery of the evidence.
However, the split in the investigation which creates these parallel paths must
occur prior to or independent of the illegality, not because of it. The question is
not what legal path the police would have inevitably taken which could have
yielded the evidence. The question is what legal path the police actually took
which would have inevitably yielded the evidence.
165 Idaho 901, 909 (2019). Thus, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not allow the Court "to
speculate on the course of action in investigation could have taken in the absence of' the
illegality-"even if that alternate course likely would have yielded the evidence." Downing, 163
Idaho at 32. In short, the doctrine is not intended to substitute "what the police should have done
for what they really did." Id. (quoting State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 (Ct. App. 1985)).
Considering the limitations of inevitable discovery, the district court erred by applying to
the officers' discovery of the heroin on Mr. Cox's person. Although Sergeant Dahlinger could
have gone to the motel, asked Ms. Briggs for the guest's name in Room 221, and used that
information coupled with her statement to apply for a search warrant, he did not do that. Instead,
Sergeant Dahlinger obtained Mr. Cox's name in the same course of action as his unlawful search
of Mr. Cox's room. (R., p.141 ("At some point, Dahlinger had learned from Briggs that room
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221 was being rented by Defendant Lonnie Cox.").) The district court did not find there was an
"existing alternative path" that would have led to the officers to discover the evidence on
Mr. Cox. Maxim, 165 Idaho at 909. Granted, the district court found Sergeant Dahlinger and
Officer Payne would have still had Mr. Cox's name from Ms. Briggs without the unlawful
search, (R., pp.157-58), but the officers' receipt of Mr. Cox's name was not an "inevitable
hypothetical[] running in parallel to the illegal action[]." Downing, 163 Idaho at 32. There is no
finding that another officer initiated a separate investigation that would have inevitably led to the
officers' discovery of Mr. Cox's arrest warrant and execution of that warrant.
For similar reasons, the independent source doctrine is inapplicable. Like inevitable
discovery, there must be a wholly independent source for the otherwise unlawfully obtained
evidence. Murray, 487 U.S. at 538. For example, a search of a warehouse pursuant to warrant
was a "genuinely independent source" of the evidence found inside if neither the officers'
decision to seek the warrant nor their previously unlawful entry into the warehouse had any
impact on the application or issuance of the warrant. Id. at 542. Here, the district court found
Given the information Dahlinger obtained from Briggs regarding her observations
of the syringe, the fact Dahlinger obtained Cox's name from Briggs in connection
with the room, and the fact Officer Payne, as a pattern and practice, always "runs"
the names of suspects to check for warrants, Cox's arrest and subsequent search
incident to arrest on the arrest warrant were not tied to the unlawful search or the
improper search warrant.

(R., p.157.) Yet Officer Payne's knowledge of Mr. Cox's name, in order to "run" it for warrants,
did not arrive though "a genuinely independent source" from Sergeant Dahlinger's investigation.

Murray, 487 U.S. at 542. If Officer Payne arrived separately from Sergeant Dahlinger, obtained
Mr. Cox's name before-or without any knowledge of-Sergeant Dahlinger's actions, and then
discovered the outstanding warrant, that would likely be an independent source for the evidence
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found on Mr. Cox's person. But, again, the officers engaged in one course of action. There was
no independent source for the discovery of evidence on Mr. Cox.
Turning to attenuation, Mr. Cox submits this doctrine is the correct exception to consider
whether to apply to the exclusionary rule to the evidence found on his person. Nonetheless, it
does not allow the State to avoid suppression in this case. Mr. Cox admits the first factor (the
elapsed time between the misconduct and the discovery of the evidence) is in the State's favor.

Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 722. The officers discovered the evidence on Mr. Cox's person about
twenty-four hours after Sergeant Dahlinger's unlawful search through Ms. Briggs. (R., pp.14143; see Exs., p.28 (return of service on arrest warrant).) Mr. Cox also admits the second factor
(the intervening circumstance) is "strongly" in the State's favor. Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 722.
There is no dispute "that the arrest warrant was valid," and the district court found that the
officers' discovered the heroin on Mr. Cox during a "lawful ... search incident to arrest."

Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 722. (R., pp.143, 157.) However, Mr. Cox argues the third factor
(flagrancy and purpose in the misconduct) weighs so heavily in his favor to require suppression.
Sergeant Dahlinger' s misconduct was purposeful and flagrant. His unlawful search of
Mr. Cox's motel room was not negligent or a good faith mistake. Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 723
(citing Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063). He did not inadvertently see the syringe through an
already-opened door or unintentionally signal to Ms. Briggs to open the door. He wanted to see
the syringe and, once confirmed, seize it for testing. However, there was "simply no reason" for
Sergeant Dahlinger to search Mr. Cox's room before he obtained the warrant. Cohagan, 162
Idaho at 724. He could have taken Ms. Briggs's statement and used that for his application.
Instead, as found by the district court, Sergeant Dahlinger went to Mr. Cox's room for the sole
purpose of looking inside and seeing the syringe. (R., pp.141, 151-53.) This type of police
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misconduct should be discouraged. Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 724-26 (discussing the "implicit
component" of exclusionary rule that its application influences officer training). It violates the
foundational tenet of the Fourth Amendment: get a warrant. Mr. Cox submits the third factor of
purposeful and flagrant misconduct weighs strongly against attenuation.
Ultimately, if this Court considers the attenuation doctrine, this Court should "ho Id that
the discovery of the evidence was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop as to break the
causal chain between the unconstitutional stop and the discovery of the evidence." Cohagan, 162
Idaho at 726. Alternatively, Mr. Cox submits this Court should vacate the district court's order
denying his motion in part and remand for the district court to make findings on this third factor
and weigh it in an attenuation analysis. State v. Fuller, 138 Idaho 60, 63 (2002) (remanding the
case for the district court to consider another basis for suppression not addressed below); see also

Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009) ("When the discretion exercise by a trial
court is affected by an error oflaw, the role of the appellate court is to note the error made and
remand the case for appropriate findings.") Therefore, Mr. Cox respectfully requests the Court
reverse or vacate the district court's order denying his motion to suppress in part and remand for
further proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
On appeal, Mr. Cox respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order
granting his motion to suppress in part, namely, the evidence obtained from the searches of his
motel room. On cross-appeal, Mr. Cox respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the
district court's order denying his motion to suppress in part, namely, the evidence found on his
person, and remand for further proceedings.
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